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1 
Online Appendix to Irrational 
Ignorance at the Patent Office 
Michael D. Frakes  
Melissa F. Wasserman 
A. Bounded Analysis of Increase in Payroll Expenses Associated  
with Doubling the Number of Hours Allocated to Examiners 
In this Section of the Appendix, we discuss a bounded analysis 
of the personnel costs to the Patent Office (“the Agency”) that result 
from doubling patent examiner time allocations. In particular, we adopt 
different multipliers to account for the full cost of a patent examiner to 
the Patent Office in excess of their base salary. As discussed in 
Section II.A, we assume a 2.04 factor of an employee’s base salary to 
account for fringe benefits, employer taxes and insurance, and 
allotments for office space, rent, equipment, replacement/turnover cost, 
managerial support, etc.  Below, we repeat the calculation in Table 2 of 
the Article but utilize a multiplier factor of 2.5 (Table A1) to provide a 
high estimate and a multiplier factor of 1.5 (Table A2) to provide a low 
estimate of the increase in payroll expenses associated with doubling 
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TABLE A1: SIMULATED INCREASE IN PAYROLL EXPENSES ASSOCIATED 
WITH DOUBLING THE NUMBER OF HOURS ALLOCATED TO EXAMINERS 
UTILIZING 2.5 MULTIPLIER FOR FULL COSTS 
  




























GS-5 237 36.3 8,603.1 $38.30 $329,512.66 
GS-7 3,244 28.7 93,102.8 $47.67 $4,416,249.66 
GS-9 9,870 26.0 256.6 $58.30 $14,887,515.12 
GS-11 20,770 23.5 488,095.0 $70.56 $34,274,823.28 
GS-12 41,825 21.5 899,237.5 $84.55 $75,660,765.91 
GS-13 85,747 18.2 1,560,595.0 $100.55 $156,150,526.46 
GS-14 254,931 16.3 4,155,375.0 $118.82 $491,366,699.51 
GS-15 12,432 16.5 205,128.0 $139.77 $28,529,927.49 
Total 430,056 17.9 7,666,757.0 $93.85 $805,613,020.24 
The mean number of hours per grade is calculated over the 2016 PAIR sample after assigning 
hour allotments to each application in the PAIR database based on the associated technology 
group and examiner grade level. 
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TABLE A2: SIMULATED INCREASE IN PAYROLL EXPENSES ASSOCIATED 
WITH DOUBLING THE NUMBER OF HOURS ALLOCATED TO EXAMINERS 
UTILIZING 1.5 MULTIPLIER FOR FULL COSTS 




























GS-5 237 36.3 8,603.1 $22.98 $197,707.60 
GS-7 3,244 28.7 93,102.8 $28.60 $2,649,749.80 
GS-9 9,870 26.0 256.6 $34.98 $8,932,509.07 
GS-11 20,770 23.5 488,095.0 $42.34 $20,563,093.97 
GS-12 41,825 21.5 899,237.5 $50.73 $45,396,459.55 
GS-13 85,747 18.2 1,560,595.0 $60.33 $93,690,315.88 
GS-14 254,931 16.3 4,155,375.0 $71.29 $294,820,019.71 
GS-15 12,432 16.5 205,128.0 $83.86 $17,117,956.49 
Total 430,056 17.9 7,666,757.0 $56.31 $483,367,812.15 
The mean number of hours per grade is calculated over the 2016 PAIR sample after 
assigning hour allotments to each application in the PAIR database based on the 
associated technology group and examiner grade level. 
This bounded analysis provides that doubling the amount of time 
extended to examiners will cost the Agency $483 million to $805 million 
per year.  
B. Estimation of Reduction of Number of Patents Granted Annually 
Due to Doubling of Examination Time Allotments 
In this Section of the Appendix, we discuss the methodology that 
we employ to predict the amount by which grant rates will fall 
subsequent to a doubling of the amount of time extended to patent 
examiners in addition to the total amount of reduced patent grants each 
year stemming from such an expansion in examination time allocations.  
For these purposes, we use the dataset discussed in Part III of 
the Article. With this information, we estimate the following empirical 
specification out of the resulting microlevel sample of patent 
applications: 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝛄𝛄𝐢𝐢 +  𝛌𝛌𝐭𝐭  +  𝛛𝛛𝐤𝐤 +  𝛃𝛃1(𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) +  𝛃𝛃𝟐𝟐(𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)
+ 𝛃𝛃3𝐄𝐄𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 
(1) 
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where a indexes the individual application, i indexes the individual 
examiner, k indexes the technology associated with the application, and 
t indexes the year in which the application is disposed of by the 
examiner. GRANTaikt indicates whether or not the given application 
was allowed by the examiner. Year fixed effects are captured by 𝛌𝛌𝐭𝐭 and 
art unit fixed effects are captured by 𝛛𝛛𝐤𝐤, each accounting for fixed 
differences in granting practices across years and across art units.1 GSit 
represents a set of variables capturing the incidence of the examiner 
assigned to the underlying application falling into each of the general 
schedule (“GS”) pay-grade levels. We drop examiners in GS-level 5 from 
this analysis because there are too few in the sample—only 7,000 
applications out of 3.9 million. We also drop GS-level 15, as most 
examiners transition into a purely supervisory role when reaching GS-
level 15 and no longer primarily examine applications. Some GS-level 
15 examiners still review occasional applications but given the 
substantial change in the nature of the job at this level, we do not trace 
the evolution of practices past GS-level 14. The GS-level 7 dummy 
variable is dropped from the regression itself, allowing GS-level 7 
examiners to serve as the reference group. EXPERit captures a set of 
dummy variables for the incidence of the relevant examiner falling into 
a range of experience-level categories, where experience is signified by 
the number of years (in two-year bins) at the time of the application’s 
disposition that the relevant examiner has been with the Patent Office. 
Included in 𝐄𝐄𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 is an indicator variable for the incidence of a large 
entity applicant.  
Examiner fixed effects are captured by 𝛄𝛄𝐢𝐢. Such effects help 
address concerns that more experienced examiners and higher GS-level 
examiners are fundamentally different in their granting tendencies 
from their more junior counterparts—e.g., concerns that examiners who 
have reached higher grade levels and thus who have been successful in 
attaining promotions may be those with a stronger inherent disposition 
toward granting in the first place. Instead, with this framework, we 
track the granting practices of individual examiners as they themselves 
experience the indicated GS-level promotion.    
This specification essentially attempts to estimate the 
relationship between grant rates and the amount of time given to 
examiners. In particular, we take a relatively nonparametric approach 
 
 1. Art units are organizational groups within the Patent Office to which patent examiners 
are assigned. Art units generally consist of between eight and twenty examiners and are organized 
along technology lines. Applications are generally randomly assigned to examiners within each art 
unit. The amount of time allocated to examiners are a function of the art unit to which they belong 
and their GS-level. By including art unit fixed effects, this approach forces us to draw on variation 
in GS-levels to derive variation in examination time allotments.   
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in this regard and focus on the relationship between an examiner’s 
grant rate and the occurrence of various GS-level promotions that carry 
with them reductions in time allocations, while accounting for various 
factors—such as experience—that could potentially confound this 
relationship. To determine the effect of a doubling of examination time, 
we would then focus on the coefficient of the GS-level 14 level dummy 
variable, as (i) this coefficient captures how much higher an examiner’s 
grant rate is at GS-level 14 relative to what it was at GS-level 7 (while 
accounting for year effects, experience effects, etc.) and (ii) time 
allocations are roughly half as large at GS-level 14 relative to GS-
level 7.  
In unreported alternative estimations, we take a more 
parametric approach to determining the relationship between 
examination time allocations and grant rates, though one that is more 
straightforward in presentation. In this alternative, for each 
application, we assign a variable, Hours, equal to the number of hours 
allocated to the examiner assigned to the application, which is a 
function of the art unit to which the examiner is assigned and the GS-
level of the examiner. We then estimate the coefficient of this Hours 
variable. Given the inclusion of examiner fixed effects and art unit fixed 
effects, this approach essentially draws on changes in time allocations 
that arise only through GS-level promotions. As such, it is in the exact 
same spirit as the specification in equation (1) except that it essentially 
fits a linear relationship between hours and grant rates—e.g., it treats 
a move from six to seven hours of time allocation as the same as the 
move from fourteen to fifteen hours and from thirty-two to thirty-three 
hours.  
We present the results from our estimation of equation (1) in 
Table A3.  
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TABLE A3: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXAMINER GS-LEVELS AND THE 
INCIDENCE OF A PATENT APPLICATION BEING GRANTED (MEAN GRANT 
INCIDENCE = 0.70) 
 (1)  











N        3,912,905 
Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered to correct for 
autocorrelation within given examiners over time. Each observation is a given 
application from the PAIR database that reached a final disposition and that was 
published in the PAIR records between March 2001 and June 2017. The 
regression includes examiner fixed effects, art unit fixed effects, examiner 
experience group fixed effects (in two-year bins), and a dummy variable indicating 
whether or not the application was filed by a large entity.  
C. Estimation of Reduction of Number in Patent-Lawsuit Pairs 
Annually Due to Doubling of Examination Time Allotments 
We now discuss the methodology that we employ to predict the 
amount by which litigation will fall subsequent to a doubling of the 
amount of time extended to patent examiners. This Section of the 
Appendix essentially formalizes the discussion of the empirical methods 
employed in Part III of the Article. For a description of the data 
underlying this exercise, we refer the reader to Part III of the Article.   
Using the individual application-level data discussed in Part III, 
we estimate the following conditional negative binomial regression 
model: 
𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 =  exp (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 +  𝛌𝛌𝐭𝐭  +  𝛛𝛛𝐤𝐤 +  𝛃𝛃1(𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) +  𝛃𝛃𝟐𝟐(𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)
+  𝛃𝛃𝟑𝟑(𝐓𝐓𝐄𝐄𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝑎𝑎) + 𝛃𝛃𝟒𝟒(𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐄𝐄𝐓𝐓𝑎𝑎) + 𝛃𝛃5𝐄𝐄𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)) 
(2) 
where a, i, k, t, GS, EXPER, 𝛌𝛌𝐭𝐭, 𝛛𝛛𝐤𝐤, and 𝐄𝐄𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 are as above. The expected 
number of times that a given patent application will wind up the subject 
of a patent lawsuit (over the litigation tracking period discussed in 
Part III of the Article) is expressed by 𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎. We also refer to this as the 
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expected number of patent-lawsuit pairs, bearing in mind that a given 
patent can be asserted in multiple lawsuits and that a given lawsuit 
often involves multiple patents.  
TENURE represents a series of binary dummy variables that 
capture the incidence of the examiner associated with the given 
application falling into different groups based on the amount of time 
the examiner ultimately spends with the Patent Office, where tenure 
groups are organized into two-year bins. This allows us to control for 
the fact that examiners who depart from the Patent Office early in their 
careers may fundamentally differ in the quality of their reviews relative 
to examiners who stay at the Patent Office for a long time.   
COHORT represents a series of dummy variables that capture 
the year in which the examiner first began working at the Patent Office. 
This allows us to control for fixed differences in the nature of 
examination practices across examiners based on the year in which they 
were hired. These differences may arise, for instance, due to changes 
over time in the training practices of the Patent Office or to changes 
over time in the examination culture of the Agency, which may have 
especially long-lasting impacts on new and impressionable hires at the 
Agency (leading to hiring cohort effects). In prior work, we 
demonstrated the critical importance of cohort dynamics in explaining 
examiner behavior.2 
We did not include cohort and tenure effects in the grant-rate 
specification, as they were subsumed by the examiner fixed effects. We 
do not include examiner fixed effects with this litigation-savings 
analysis because doing so while also accounting for art unit effects and 
estimating a negative binomial regression over nearly four million 
applications would simply be too unwieldly. Nonetheless, the cohort and 
tenure effects (in addition to the other controls) go a long way toward 
accounting for the heterogeneity across examiners. The pattern of 
results from the grant-rate specifications are nearly identical when 
estimating examiner fixed effects specifications and when instead 
including hiring-year cohort and tenure effects. 
Expose captures an exposure variable for the negative binomial 
regression and equals the amount of time left between the present and 
the year in which the application was disposed. This accounts for the 
fact that applications disposed of in 2002 had a longer time period to 
experience a litigation event relative to applications disposed of in 2014. 
 
 2. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa. F. Wasserman, Patent Office Cohorts, 65 DUKE L.J. 1601, 
1602 (2016).  
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D. Estimation of Reduction of Examination Review Rounds Due to 
Doubling of Examination Time Allotments 
Table A4 presents results from an empirical specification 
identical to that estimated in Table A3, but where the dependent 
variable equals the number of office action rounds that occur for the 
application. This variable captures the degree of back and forth between 
the examiner and the applicant, where the specification is meant to 
estimate the extent to which that back and forth goes down (or up) as 
examiners are given more (or less) time. Given the small number of 
zeroes in this outcome variable across the observations, we elect as our 
primary approach to estimate an Ordinary Least Squares regression 
model as we do in Table A3, which also allows us to include examiner 
fixed effects. We note, however, that these results are nearly identical 
when instead estimating a negative binomial model similar to that set 
forth in equation (2). 
TABLE A4: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXAMINER GS LEVELS AND THE 
NUMBER OF OFFICE ACTIONS  
 (1)  
 OLS RESULTS  











N 3,831,210  
Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered to correct for 
autocorrelation within given examiners over time. Each observation is a given 
application from the PAIR database that reached a final disposition and that was 
published in the PAIR records between March 2001 and June 2017. The 
regression includes examiner fixed effects, art unit fixed effects, examiner 
experience group fixed effects (in two-year bins), and a dummy variable indicating 
whether or not the application was filed by a large entity.  
If we were to use these estimates of reduced rounds of review 
from doubling examination time to estimate the amount of saved 
Wasserman_Final Look (Do Not Delete) 4/27/2019  10:32 AM 
2019] ONLINE APPENDIX: IRRATIONAL IGNORANCE 9 
prosecution costs, we would likely estimate nearly $1 billion in savings 
annually (considering the number of annual dispositions, the average 
number of reduced rounds of review, and the prosecution costs 
associated with each round of review). This would overwhelmingly 
reinforce the conclusions of our Article. We hesitate to make a 
prediction so large, however, given one caveat with the estimation 
underlying Table A4. The average number of office actions for each 
application in our sample is 2.6, with at least 10% of applications having 
over 5. One might be concerned that the increases in office actions with 
GS-level changes documented in Table A4 are driven by increases in 
rounds of review during the later stages of these long application 
processes. This is potentially concerning, as it may not reflect an impact 
of time allocations but instead may result somewhat mechanically from 
changes in the application sample throughout the GS-level progression. 
That is, those applications with especially large numbers of rounds of 
review are those applications that remain under review for many years. 
Applications of this sort may be less represented among the set of 
applications disposed of by examiners while they are still at lower GS-
levels considering that examiners may have been promoted to higher 
GS-levels by the time those applications are disposed of. Perhaps those 
dynamics alone might explain why we observe more rounds of review 
with GS-level promotions.  
We attempt to address this concern in Table A5 by limiting the 
sample to those applications that undergo at most three office actions 
before disposition—a set of applications that will not disproportionately 
be disposed of by examiners at upper GS-levels. As demonstrated by 
Table A5, the results change very little, which suggests that the 
increases in office action churn by GS-level changes is perhaps driven 
by changes in office action counts at earlier stages of the examination 
processes, appeasing the above-stated sample-selection concerns and 
thereby continuing to suggest that by giving examiners less time to 
review applications, the Patent Office may be encouraging office action 
churn and thus greater rounds of review. In turn, this suggests that by 
giving examiners more time, we may reduce the number of rounds of 
review and thereby save prosecutorial expenses associated with 
responding to office actions. 
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TABLE A5: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXAMINER GS-LEVELS AND THE 
NUMBER OF OFFICE ACTIONS, CONDITIONAL ON LESS THAN THREE 
OFFICER ACTIONS PER APPLICATION  
 (1)  
 OLS RESULTS  











N        2,826,018  
Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered to correct for 
autocorrelation within given examiners over time. Each observation is a given 
application from the PAIR database that reached a final disposition and that was 
published in the PAIR records between March 2001 and June 2017. The 
regression includes examiner fixed effects, art unit fixed effects, examiner 
experience group fixed effects (in two-year bins), and a dummy variable indicating 
whether or not the application was filed by a large entity.  
Why might it be the case that by giving examiners more time to 
review applications, we may see a reduction in the number of rounds of 
review that is perhaps driven by less churn in the earlier rounds of 
review, as opposed to in the later rounds of review? To answer this 
question, we turn to a discussion from one of our recent papers.3 In that 
work, we started by observing that examination time expectations are 
tied to productivity expectations, where those productivity expectations 
are monitored over quota periods. In particular, examiners are expected 
to hit biweekly workload goals and quarterly workload goals. If 
examiners delay in their productive efforts over this quota period, then 
they will be forced to rush to hit their productivity targets at the end of 
those periods, provided they are sufficiently motivated to hit those 
targets. In our prior work, we theorized that in these moments of end-
of-quota rush and in the case of their first office actions for given 
applications, examiners may be incentivized to issue uninformative and 
 
 3. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Procrastination in the Workplace: Evidence 
from U.S. Patent Examiners (unpublished manuscript) (on filed with authors). 
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easily-overcome rejections—known as “shotgun” rejections—which can 
be executed in a short period of time. This strategy gives examiners the 
option to correct these ill-informed and possibly incorrect rejections at 
a later moment, when they are able to actually give the application 
appropriate attention. In our prior work, we documented evidence of a 
substantial amount of shotgun rejections and indeed found that 
examiners were able to direct the appropriate level of attention to those 
applications at some point in a later round of review, in which case we 
documented little difference in ultimate disposition outcomes between 
those applications that experienced a rush at the end of the quota period 
during their first round of review relative to those first round reviews 
that experienced no rush. We concluded that the real consequence of 
these shotgun rejections is thus examination delay. In other words, one 
can view that rushed first office action as a wasted round of review that 
must be made up in subsequent rounds.  
To be sure, this story originates from a specific kind of time 
constraint—i.e., a rush at the end of a quota period—whereas the 
present Article pertains to the amount of time given to review the 
application as a whole. But bear in mind that when examiners are given 
less time to review applications as whole, they are effectively expected 
to hit higher quota counts. In this light, if examiners mismanage their 
time during quota periods (as supported by our prior work)4 and if they 
are given higher quota counts, they may be more likely to find 
themselves in an end-of-quota rush and thus more likely to waste a 
round of review with a “shotgun” rejection.  
In a final empirical check, we attempt to lend further support to 
this shotgun-rejection theory by drawing on insights from our previous 
research.5 In our prior work, we developed a marker suggestive of a 
wasted first round review. Specifically, we flagged whether or not the 
examiner issued a “nonfinal“ rejection on the second round—i.e., a 
rejection in which they state new grounds for rejection not previously 
identified in the first round.  One can effectively view this as an 
admission of an inadequate first round of review. Typically, in second 
office actions, examiners will instead either allow the application or 
issue a “final” rejection that does not set forth different bases of 
rejection from the first round (of course, this rejection is not technically 
“final” in that applicants can use certain tools to continue with the same 
application). In Table A6, we supplement the analyses from Tables A4 
and A5 and test the relationship between GS-level promotions and the 
 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. 
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incidence of a nonfinal, second office-action rejection. This approach 
also avoids the concerns raised above over the fact that low-GS-level 
examiners may not dispose of applications that undergo a high number 
of rounds of review; after all, examiners throughout all GS-levels review 
second office actions.  
TABLE A6: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXAMINER GS-LEVELS AND THE 
INCIDENCE OF A NONFINAL, SECOND-OFFICE ACTION REJECTION  
 (1)  
 OLS RESULTS  











N 3,914,313  
Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered to correct for 
autocorrelation within given examiners over time. Each observation is a given 
application from the PAIR database that reached a final disposition and that was 
published in the PAIR records between March 2001 and June 2017. The 
regression includes examiner fixed effects, art unit fixed effects, examiner 
experience group fixed effects (in two-year bins), and a dummy variable indicating 
whether or not the application was filed by a large entity.  
Table A6 suggests that as examiners are given less time to 
review applications, they are more likely to issue nonfinal, second office-
action rejections. Again considering that nonfinal, second office-action 
rejections may be seen as an empirical marker for a wasted first round 
of review, this finding is consistent with the idea that if the Agency 
gives examiners more time to review applications, we may see fewer 
wasted rounds of review, a development that would lead to potential 
savings in prosecution costs. There are a couple of important things to 
note from the results presented in Table A6. First, the magnitude of the 
reduced number of rounds of review implied by this nonfinal, second 
office-action  rejection analysis is less than that implied by the direct 
estimates of reduced rounds from Tables A4 and A5. This is perhaps, in 
part, due to the fact that the Patent Office looks negatively on these 
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occurrences, leaving some examiners less inclined to articulate new 
bases of rejections in the second round, perhaps instead hoping to do so 
after the applicant has filed a Request for Continuing Examination and 
moved on to subsequent rounds. Second, we acknowledge that nonfinal, 
second office-action rejections start to decline once examiners reach GS-
level 13 and GS-level 14, though they are still more likely as compared 
to the lowest GS-levels. This, in part, may be due to some reduction in 
supervision that comes from GS-level 13 and GS-level 14 promotions 
specifically, as we discuss in much greater depth in our prior work.6 
That is, in the course of their time at GS-level 13, some examiners 
acquire the right to independently sign off on their own first office 
actions. Examiners acquire the right to sign off on all aspects of their 
review upon reaching GS-level 14. The fact that these supervisory 
changes occur specifically for these two promotions does not 
compromise our entire GS-level methodology in that supervisory 
changes do not occur in all promotions that change examination time, 
as we have discussed previously. In the context of a salient admission 
of poor first-round work product, however, one might not be surprised 
to see that examiners will become less inclined to make such an 
admissions when not under the shadow of someone signing off on their 
reviews.  
All told, we fail to find any evidence at all to support any 
suggestion that examinations will experience a greater number of 
rounds of back-and-forth between applicants and examiners when 
examiners are given more time. If anything, we find to the contrary—
i.e., that greater examination time may lead to less office churn.  
E. Estimation of Federal Litigation Costs  
To determine the average litigation costs associated with a 
patent-lawsuit pair, we draw on information from three sources: (1) the 
annual Report of the Economic Survey from the American Intellectual 
Property Law Association (“AIPLA Surveys”), which provides annual 
breakdowns of average litigation costs associated with cases, broken 
down by stages of litigation reached and by amounts at stake in the 
lawsuit; (2) a recent working paper by Christopher Cotropia and 
colleagues, A Granular Analysis of Civil Litigation,7 which examines 
 
 6. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent 
Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level 
Application Data, 99 REV. ECON. & STAT. 550 (2017).  
 7. Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan, Kyle Rozema & David L. Schwartz, A Granular 
Analysis of Civil Litigation (Aug. 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).   
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docket entries of sixteen thousand patent infringement lawsuits and, 
among other things, assesses the distribution of case terminations 
across different stages of trial; and (3) data on patent infringement 
lawsuits from the Lex Machina database with information on the 
resulting damages for those suits with damages awards.  
Ultimately, our goal is to derive an expected litigation costs 
amount in light of the distribution of case costs along different 
combinations of: (1) amounts at stake in the cases and (2) stages of the 
lawsuit completed. We derive the necessary probabilities for this 
distribution from the Cotropia et al. paper and from the Lex Machina 
data, while deriving the associated expenses from the AIPLA Surveys. 
Prior to 2017, these latter surveys provide median litigation expenses 
for defending lawsuits separately depending on whether the suit 
reached the end of discovery or whether it culminated with a trial 
judgement. In 2017, they added a separate category and presented costs 
associated with completing initial case management.  
In the Cotropia et al. paper, we learn that 41% of suits fail to 
reach this case management stage (though most (79%) at least reach 
the point where the defendant answers the complaint). This raises the 
first question that we confront in this analysis: How much in litigation 
expenses do we assign to these 41% of suits considering that the AIPLA 
Surveys do not provide costs associated with suits that terminate just 
prior to this case management stage? It would be inaccurate to assume 
that the litigation expenses associated with these suits are $0. After all, 
most entailed at least an answer to the compliant, and for those settled, 
there would be litigation expenses associated with settlement. 
Accordingly, we proceed by assuming that the litigation expenses 
occurred for cases in this category are half of those reported by the 
AIPLA for those completing case management.  
Next, we note that since the data we use to form predictions of 
the number of patent-case pairs that may be eliminated by doubling 
examination time comes from applications disposed of and case 
outcomes between 2001 and 2017, we aim to draw on the costs reported 
by the AIPLA over that time period (though nonetheless converted to 
today’s dollars). While the AIPLA only began to report cost amounts for 
suits ending at case management in 2017, we can attempt to impute the 
amount for earlier years by observing how the other reported costs—
which were reported over the entire time period—change over time and 
scaling appropriately.  
The second important category of costs reported by the AIPLA 
are usually phrased as litigation expenses through the end of discovery. 
With the latest report, the AIPLA clarifies that this is inclusive of 
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discovery, motions and claim construction. The Cotropia et al. paper 
reports that roughly 12.1% of cases reach a claim construction ruling. 
This presents the next important question for our purposes. This means 
that 47% of cases are terminated following a case management hearing 
but prior to the point of claim construction. The AIPLA, however, only 
reports costs for cases up to the point of case management and up to 
point of claim construction, not in between. However, Cotropia and 
colleagues demonstrate that out of those 59% of cases that at least reach 
case management, most will continue for many more months before 
terminating—i.e., most cases that reach case management do not 
simply terminate at that point. On average, following the point of case 
management, cases will spend an additional twenty-one months before 
terminating (with a median of fourteen months post-case management). 
As such, while the majority of these cases do not go all the way to the 
point of claim construction, many likely proceed many months into the 
discovery process, likely incurring additional expenses. Given these 
duration statistics from Cotropria and collegues, we elect to assign 
litigation expenses for those cases that at least reach case management 
but that fail to reach claim construction equal to the average of the case 
management and claim construction/end-of-discovery costs reported by 
the AIPLA.  
Next, we consider those set of cases that at least reach claim 
construction but do not reach trial. According to Cotropia and 
colleagues, this group characterizes 7.9% of all suits. Cotropia and 
colleagues report that, conditional on reaching the claim construction 
stage, suits will spend on average roughly 20.9 months post-claim 
construction until termination (with a median of sixteen months post-
claim construction). Given this distribution of time-to-disposition post-
claim construction, for those suits that at least reach claim construction 
but do not proceed to trial, we assign litigation costs equal to the 
average of the end-of-discovery and full-trial costs reported by the 
AIPLA.  
Next, we consider the remaining 4.2% of cases that reach trial. 
For these cases, we assign litigation costs equal to the full-trial costs 
reported by the AIPLA.  
The next important consideration involves the amount at stake 
in litigation. The AIPLA reports litigation expenses (by stage of suit 
completion) separately for the following groups: (1) less than $1 million 
at stake, (2) $1–$10 million, (3) $10–$25 million, and (4) $25+ million. 
Unfortunately, we are aware of no data source that indicates the 
distribution of amounts at risk for the full set of cases involving some 
litigation. Easier to obtain, of course, is data on the distribution of 
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damages across cases that have at least some damages awards. Such 
information is available from the Lex Machina database. With this 
distribution, we can place a lower bound on the percent of cases that at 
least have greater than $1 million at stake. That is, if we assume all 
cases that do not culminate in a damages award have less than $1 
million at stake, we know that at least 3% to 4% of all cases filed have 
greater than $1 million at stake, since at least this amount culminates 
in a judgment with damages exceeding $1 million. Similarly, we know 
that at least 1% to 2% of all cases filed have at least greater than $10 
million at stake, since at least this amount culminates in a judgment 
with damages exceeding $10 million.  
In our baseline estimates, however, we try not to simply rely on 
these lower bounds, as that may be giving away too much. Surely, some 
amount of those cases filed that do not culminate in an observable 
damages award have amounts at stake greater than $1 million. The key 
question is how many. One might surmise that the distribution of 
damages levels among those receiving some damages is informative 
here, in which event roughly 45% of cases would have amounts at stake 
exceeding $1 million, 24% of cases would have amounts at stake 
exceeding $10 million, and 16% of cases would have amounts at stake 
exceeding $25 million. The problem with this, of course, is that those 
cases that reach a judgment with damages may not be representative 
of all cases filed when it comes to the question of how much is at stake. 
After all, cases with more at stake may be more likely to reach the trial 
stage in the first place, considering that there is greater room for 
divergent party expectations—and thus failed settlements—when 
potential damages are greater. Of course, this then leaves a substantial 
gulf between these lower and upper bounds. That is, the percentage of 
cases with amounts at stake greater than $1 million is somewhere 
between 4% and 45% of cases.  For our purposes, we take what we hope 
is a conservative approach and assume that the right answer for the 
full set of filed cases is a quarter of the way between these two bounds. 
That is, we assume that at least 14% of cases have over $1 million at 
stake, at least 7% of cases have over $10 million at stake, and at least 
4% of cases have over $25 million at stake.  
Let us make one important final note regarding the AIPLA 
numbers. The AIPLA cost estimates are one-sided only, in that they 
only use costs associated with defending a suit, thereby omitting costs 
associated with the parties asserting the underlying patents. For the 
expected litigation costs that we present, however, we attempt to 
present total expected costs inclusive of both plaintiff and defendant 
expenses. For these purposes, we assume that the plaintiff costs match 
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those of the defense. Supporting this assumption, the 2015 AIPLA 
economic survey indicated that a majority of its survey respondents 
reported that assertion costs are the same as defense costs.  
Putting this all together, we set forth the following table that 
demonstrates: (1) the various possible combinations of amounts at stake 
and litigation stages, (2) the probabilities associated with the relevant 
combination, and (3) the litigation costs associated with that 
combination. From these, we derive the expected amount of litigation 
costs per case, which comes out to $539,949.30. Bear in mind that each 
patent case may be associated with more than one underlying patent. 
Since our empirical analysis in the text is designed to predict the 
number of patent-case pairs that may be reduced by giving examiners 
additional examination time, we also endeavor to derive the expected 
litigation costs associated with a given patent-case pair. This final step 
is relatively straightforward—we simply divided the above estimate by 
the average number of patents per case throughout our sample period 
(2.3), using data from Lex Machina for such purposes. Doing so, we 
estimate an expected litigation cost per patent-case pair of $234,760.60. 
On a final note, we acknowledge that this analysis rests heavily 
on the cost estimates from the AIPLA. While this is the best source 
available for our purposes, we acknowledge that our analysis may be 
inaccurate depending on the validity of the survey results reported by 
the AIPLA. 
TABLE A7: EXPECTED LITIGATION COSTS PER PATENT AND PER PATENT-
CASE PAIR 






















- - - 
<$1 million 









0.403 $440,000 $177,469.60 
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0.068 $1,100,000 $74,734.00 
 Trial (4.2%) 0.036 $1,400,000 $50,568.00 
$1–$10 














0.006 $2,950,000 $16,313.50 
 Trial (4.2%) 0.003 $4,000,000 $11,760.00 
$10–$25 














0.002 $5,000,000 $11,850.00 
 Trial (4.2%) 0.001 $6,200,000 $7,812.00 
>$25 million 













0.003 $8,000,000 $25,280.00 













- - - $234,760.60 
F. Bounded Analysis with Respect to Federal Litigation Costs 
In this Section of the Appendix, we discuss a robustness exercise 
in which we place bounds on the savings in federal litigation costs that 
may arise from doubling patent examiner time allocations. In 
particular, we relax assumptions associated with both (1) how we 
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account for the associated expenses for those cases that terminate 
between the three major case milestones documented by Cotropia and 
colleagues and for which the AILPA Surveys provide annual 
breakdowns of average litigation costs and (2) how we treat the 
distribution of the amounts at stake in the cases. Again, from the 
Cotropia et al. paper, we learn that 59% of suits reach the case 
management stage, 12.1% of suits reach the end of discovery/claim 
construction ruling, and 4.2% of suits reach trial. In our baseline 
specification, we proceed by assuming that the litigation expenses 
occurred for cases that fail to meet the case management stage is half 
of those reported by the AIPLA for those completing case management, 
that the litigation expenses occurred for cases that terminated following 
a case management hearing but prior to the point of claim construction 
are equal to the average of the case management and claim 
construction/end-of-discovery costs, and that the litigation expenses 
occurred for cases that terminated following claim construction ruling 
but prior to the point of trial are equal to the average of the end-of-
discovery and full-trial costs reported by the AIPLA. In Table A8, we 
repeat the calculation from Table A7 but assume for those cases that 
terminate in between major case milestones that litigation expenses are 
equal to a quarter of the way between the costs associated with the two 
cabining milestones (Table A8) to provide a low estimate of litigation 
savings and three quarters of the way between the costs associated with 
the two cabining milestones (Table A9) to provide a high estimate of the 
costs reported by the AIPLA for the cabining case milestones.   
TABLE A8: EXPECTED LITIGATION COSTS PER PATENT AND PER PATENT-
CASE PAIR ASSUMING THAT LITIGATION EXPENSES FOR THOSE CASES 
THAT TERMINATE IN BETWEEN MAJOR CASE MILESTONES ARE ONE-
FOURTH OF THE WAY BETWEEN THE COSTS FOR THE CABINING CASE 
MILESTONES 



























0.353 $20,000 $7,052.00 
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0.068 $550,000 $37,367.00 

















0.006 $1,475,000 $8,156.75 
 Trial (4.2%) 0.003 $4,000,000 $11,760.00 
$10–$25 
million (3% 














0.002 $2,500,000 $5,925.00 
 Trial (4.2%) 0.001 $6,200,000 $7,812.00 
>$25 million 














0.003 $4,000,000 $12,640.00 













- - - $136,280.29 
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TABLE A9: EXPECTED LITIGATION COSTS PER PATENT AND PER PATENT-
CASE PAIR ASSUMING THAT LITIGATION EXPENSES FOR THOSE CASES 
THAT TERMINATE IN BETWEEN MAJOR CASE MILESTONES ARE THREE-
FOURTHS OF THE WAY BETWEEN THE COSTS FOR THE CABINING CASE 
MILESTONES 







































0.068 $1,650,000 $112,101.00 
 Trial (4.2%) 0.036 $1,400,000 $50,568.00 
$1–$10 















0.006 $4,425,000 $24,470.30 
 Trial (4.2%) 0.003 $4,000,000 $11,760.00 
$10–$25 















0.002 $7,500,000 $17,775.00 
 Trial (4.2%) 0.001 $6,200,000 $7,812.00 
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>$25 million 














0.003 $12,000,000 $37,920.00 













- - - $333,240.86 
 
Second, in our baseline specification, we also assume a 
distribution of amounts at risk in a lawsuit that is a quarter between 
the lower bound and upper bound estimates. The AIPLA reports 
litigation expenses (by stage of suit completion) separately for the 
following groups: (1) less than $1 million at stake, (2) $1–$10 million,  
(3) $10–$25 million, and (4) $25+ million. Unfortunately, we are aware 
of no data source that indicates the distribution of amounts at risk for 
the full set of cases involving some litigation. Thus, as described above, 
we utilized data on the distribution of damages across cases that have 
at least some damages awards to place lower and upper bounds of the 
amounts at risk in a lawsuit. In Tables A10 and A11, we replicate our 
calculations from Table A7 above but utilize the lower (Table A10) and 
upper bound estimates (Table A11) of the distribution of amounts at 
risk.  
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TABLE A10: EXPECTED LITIGATION COSTS PER PATENT AND PER 
PATENT-CASE PAIR UTILIZING THE LOWER BOUND ESTIMATE OF THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF AMOUNTS AT RISK 






































0.07600 $1,100,000 $83,597.80 
 Trial (4.2%) 0.0404 $1,400,000 $56,565.60 
$1–$10 














0.00158 $2,950,000 $4,661.00 
 Trial (4.2%) 0.00084 $4,000,000 $3,360.00 
$10–$25 
million (1.3% 













0.001027 $5,000,000 $5,135.00 







0.0205 $238,000 $487.90 
 Post-case 
management, no 
0.02345 $3,238,000 $75,93.11 
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0.00395 $8,000,000 $3,160.00 















- - - $177,634.55 
 
 
TABLE A11: EXPECTED LITIGATION COSTS PER PATENT AND PER 
PATENT-CASE PAIR UTILIZING THE UPPER BOUND ESTIMATE OF THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF AMOUNTS AT RISK 






















- - - 
<$1 million 













0.04345 $1,100,000 $47,795.00 







0.0861 $100,000 $8,610.00 




0.09849 $1,050,000 $103,415.50 
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0.01659 $2,950,000 $48,941.50 
 Trial (4.2%) 0.00882 $4,000,000 $35,280.00 
$10–$25 














0.0632 $5,000,000 $316,000.00 
 Trial (4.2%) 0.0336 $6,200,000 $208,320.00 
>$25 million 













0.01264 $8,000,000 $101,120.00 













- - - $949,548.14 
 
G. Estimation of Legal Costs Associated with PTAB Proceedings  
Critical to our analysis is also the need to determine legal 
savings related to the Patent and Trial Board (“PTAB”) giving 
examiners more time to review applications. Necessary for such 
purposes is an estimation of the average legal expenses associated with 
a PTAB proceeding. To derive this estimate, we likewise turn to the 
annual Report of the Economic Survey of the AIPLA. The AIPLA 
likewise reports different costs depending on the stage of the PTAB 
proceeding reached upon its termination. Our PTAB records suggest 
that roughly seventy-five percent of PTAB proceedings are instituted. 
For those twenty-five percent of petitions that are filed but not 
instituted, we assess legal costs of $80,000 per side, as reported by the 
AIPLA surveys. For the remainder, we assess costs of $275,000, using 
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the AIPLA cost figures for “through PTAB hearing.” These figures thus 
imply that the average PTAB petition filed will garner costs of $226,250 
per side, or $452,500 total. 
 
